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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
litigation be present; and that some awareness of the vulnerability to
the later claim have existed, by reason of the "close relation," when
the earlier litigation was being contested.
Liberalized application of collateral estoppel tends to alleviate the
need for compulsory counterclaim, joinder, and cross-claim statutes.
By one procedural avenue or another, therefore, the courts are moving
toward their objectives: the final disposition of complex controversies
in a single trial.
DENIS J. WAGNER
Criminal Law: Dismissal of Indictment Obtained in Violation
of Constitutional Rights: In Jones v. United States,1 the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed
the conviction of defendant for robbery, holding that, where substantial
prejudice results, an indictment obtained in violation of federal con-
stitutional rights must be dismissed. The court saw "neither reason nor
authority"2 for distinguishing between unconstitutional composition
of a grand jury, which vitiated the indictment in Cassell v. Texas,3
and unconstitutional proceedings of a grand jury in Jones.
The court observed that defendant did not consent to being brought
before the grand jury and was taken there in handcuffs. No one in-
formed him prior to his appearance before the grand jury that he need
not testify if taken there, although police and the committing magistrate
told him in general terms that he need not incriminate himself. The
court also pointed out that when defendant actually faced the grand
jury, the warning the prosecutor gave him was inadequate to protect
his rights even if his presence had been voluntary. The prosecutor told
defendant that he need not answer questions and that his answers could
be used against him "at any future trial." However, defendant was not
informed that the grand jury might use his answers as a basis for in-
dicting him; nor was he told that he was entitled to consult counsel
before being questioned by the grand jury. In light of the fifth amend-
ment guarantee that "no person ... shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself," the court felt that the above pro-
cedure could not be justified.
In Counselnman v. Hitchcock4 the United States Supreme Court held
that a grand jury investigation of a crime is "a criminal case"5at which
incriminating questions need not be answered. In the Jones decision,
the court declared that implicit in the Supreme Court's action in Lawn
v. United States6 was the proposition that the taking of an accused
1 No. 17688, D.C. Cir., Feb. 6, 1964.
2Id. at 10.
3 339 U.S. 282 (1950).
4 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
5 Id. at 562.
6 335 U.S. 339 (1958).
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before a grand jury without his consent and asking him any questions
violated his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.
The court in Jones admitted that theirs might be a minority view,
citing United States v. Cleary7 in which it was held that the grand jury
is basically a law enforcement agency and an important investigative
instrument of the prosecutor, and that a grand jury proceeding is not
closely analogous to a criminal trial. According to the Cleary decision,
appearance before a grand jury is not in itself an unduly coercive situ-
ation, and the usual nervousness and confusion of the witness is not
sufficient to render his testimony involuntary. "The important factor is
the lack of even the slightest suggestion that government officials ap-
plied any pressure or engaged in any form of misconduct which con-
tributed to his testifying." s
If Cleary represents the majority view, the court in Jones felt that
it should now disregard the weight of authority and start with a rule
of its own, "consistent with practical experience." 9 In justifying its
position, the court pointed out that mere interrogation before a grand
jury may harm the accused even if he makes no direct incriminating
statement, as his appearance, manner, and voice may be incriminating
in the minds of members of the jury.
Because grand jury investigations are secret, as observed in Powell
v. United States,"0 one is "isolated from the protection of counsel and
presiding judge and insulated from the critical observation of the
public."'" Though one may be unqualified to decide for himself what
questions to answer, he must decide at his peril. If he answers in-
criminating questions, he will be indicted. If he refuses to testify at all,
or to answer some questions on the ground that answers might in-
criminate him, the grand jury may draw conclusions. If he refuses to
answer questions that are not incriminating, he may be guilty of con-
tempt.
The court pointed out that defendant's schooling stopped with the
third grade and that he could not read and could barely write. The
prosecutor read aloud the confessions which defendant bad made after
prolonged questioning by police and asked him if they were his and
true. As he acknowledged that they were, and as the grand jury sub-
sequently indicted him, the court felt that he was plainly prejudiced by
the interrogation.
In addition to the weight of authority as represented by the Cleary
decision, the dissenting judge felt that four facts in Jones called for a
contrary holding. First, defendant was advised four times before he
7265 F. 2d 459 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 936 (1959).8 Id., 265 F. 2d at 462.
9 Note 1 supra, at 5.
10 226 F. 2d 269 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
1 Id. at 274.
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spoke to the grand jury that he need not speak: twice by the arresting
officer who questioned him, once by the committing magistrate in open
court, and once by the prosecutor before the grand jury. Second, the
evidence indicates that defendant wanted to speak and said so twice:
once to the arresting officer and once to the grand jury. Third, the trial
jury was not told what defendant said and did before the grand jury.
Fourth, ample other evidence was available and presumably was pre-
sented to the grand jury.
The majority also declared that defendant's sixth amendment right
"to have the assistance of counsel for his defense"' was violated, and
that a defendant "requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step
in the proceedings against him." 13 Because indictment is a crucial "step
in the proceedings against" the accused, when defendant was about to
be taken before the grand jury for questioning, the court felt he should
have been permitted to consult with counsel appointed for him by the
committing magistrate. In their opinion, however, the prosecution pre-
vented defendant from doing so by failing to inform counsel of the
impending examination. The court believed that counsel might have
succeeded in preventing him from being taken before the grand jury,
and that counsel certainly could have given him advice as to what ques-
tions he should answer if taken there.1 4
The dissenting judge admitted that taking defendant before the grand
jury without notifying his lawyer "was bad practice and bad ethics and
ought to be condemned." 1 However, he did not feel that a valid indict-
12 Congress has implemented the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel.
The District of Columbia Code provides in section 2-2202 that the Legal Aid
Agency "shall make attorneys available to represent indigents in criminal
proceedings in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
and in preliminary hearings in felony cases," and that each court "will make
every reasonable effort to provide assignment of counsel as early in the pro-
ceedings as practicable." Rule 44 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that "If the defendant appears in court without counsel, the court
shall advise him of his right to counsel and assign counsel to represent him
at every stage of the proceeding unless he elects to proceed without counsel
or is able to obtain counsel." Criminal Rule 24 of the Court of General
Sessions is worded in the same fashion, and the committing magistrate in Jones,
a judge of that court, appointed counsel for defendant in accordance with said
rule.
13 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932). A recent Second Circuit case
implies that if the prosecutor questions the accused without notice to his
counsel, at least in the absence of special circumstances, evidence so obtained
should be excluded. United States v. Massiah, 307 F. 2d 62 (2d Cir. 1962),
cert. granted, 374 U.S. 805 (1963). The Fifth Circuit has adopted the rule
that counsel must be available whenever the accused is questioned after in-
dictment. Lee v. United States, 322 F. 2d 770 (5th Cir. 1963). The New York
Court of Appeals now recognizes an accused's right to counsel from the
moment of arrest. People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y. 2d 148, 193 N.E. 2d 628, 243
N.Y.S. 2d 841 (1963).14 The court felt that it was most unlikely that defendant would have repeated
his former confessions there if he had been counseled, and that the lawyer
might have advised him that those confessions were illegally obtained and
could not be used at any trial.
15 Note 1 supra, at 32.
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ment could be quashed on this ground, saying that "there is no rule...
which says that a person must have a lawyer before he can be taken
before a grand jury."16 As the majority agreed that defendant could
not have had a lawyer with him in the grand jury room,' 7 the dissenting
judge pointed out that counsel could only have advised him that he need
not speak, and he had already received this advice from the committing
magistrate. In addition, he was formally given a full warning by the
prosecuting attorney before he spoke to the grand jury, and the judge
felt that to require a lawyer in this situation would be "to assert the
necessity of a ritual without substance."'"
The dissenting judge emphasized that the majority's decision was
in conflict with the rule pronounced by the Supreme Court in Costello
v. United States"0 and Lawn v. United States0 that "an indictment re-
turned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury, like an in-
formation drawn by the prosecutor, if valid on its face, is enough to
call for trial of the charge on the merits."' However, the majority justi-
fied its dismissal of the indictment against defendant on the ground that
this broad language only applies when the proceedings have not violated
any constitutional rights of the accused.
2
With the Jones decision now the law in the District of Columbia
Circuit, either of the two constitutional grounds here asserted for dis-
missing a grand jury indictment, violation of the privilege against self-
incrimination or violation of the right to the assistance of counsel, may
be applied to numerous other cases. The dissenting judge predicted that
the decision would "prove a vast impediment to the public interest in
the administration of justice."2'
The Jones holding could well affect the course of a John Doe pro-
ceeding2 4 in Wisconsin. For example, a defendant who is informed
16 Ibid. Arguments that such a rule exists were rejected in Gilmore v. United
States, 129 F. 2d 199, 203 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 631 (1942).
17n re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 333 (1957). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
6(d) clearly forbids the presence of counsel by limiting those present while
the grand jury is in session to "attorneys for the government, the witness
under examination, interpreters when needed, and . . . a stenographer."
1s Note 1 supra, at 33.
10 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
20355 U.S. 339 (1958).
21 Id. at 349; note 19 supra, at 363.
22 The court said with reference to the Costello decision: "Due deference forbids
us to interpret the opinion as containing a vast dictum to the effect that ...
the proceedings of a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury may violate
any number of the defendant's constitutional rights, including his right to the
assistance of counsel and his privilege against self-incrimination, without af-
fecting the validity of the indictment. Costello, therefore, is no bar to our
decision that an indictment obtained in violation of constitutional rights must
be dismissed." Note 1 supra, at 11.
23 Id. at 34.
24 WIs. STAT. § 954.025 (1961): "John Doe Proceeding. If a person complains
to a magistrate that he has reason to believe that a crime has been committed
within his jurisdiction, the magistrate shall examine the complainant on oath
and any witnesses produced by him and may, and at the request of the dis-
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against as a result of his testimony before a Wisconsin circuit court
judge conducting a John Doe investigation may rely upon this case
in an attempt to invalidate the information. Assuming that the same
lack of consent is present when the witness is subpoenaed to appear
before a magistrate, as when he is taken before a grand jury in hand-
cuffs-the situation in Jones, a strong argument could be made for the
reversal of a resulting conviction on the ground that the information was
obtained in violation of his state constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination. A. WILLIAm FINKE
Torts: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress as a Separate
Tort: Plaintiff sued for the recovery of damages incurred as a result
of defendant's conduct in completing a contract to replace the wooden
siding on plaintiff's home and to install combination aluminum windows
and doors. Defendant delayed work on the contract, exposed the occu-
pants of plaintiff's home to severe winter weather without adequate pro-
tection, and, through numerous personal contacts, intimidated, coerced,
and bullied the plaintiff. The plaintiff's damage consisted of severe
emotional distress brought on by a depressive reaction which left her
unable to function effectively in her home or at her job. The trial court
found defendant's conduct unreasonable, but refused to impose liability
on the ground that such conduct was not extreme and outrageous, and
of not sufficient flagrant character so as to be the basis for relief.
In Alsteen v. Gehl,' the court upheld the trial court's decision that
the defendant's conduct would not be considered outrageous and ex-
treme by the average member of the community. The court recognized
the existence of an independent tort which heretofore had not been
acknowledged in this jurisdiction:
One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally
causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability
for such emotional distress and for bodily harm resulting from it.2
Four elements must be established before recovery is allowed:
1) The conduct must be intentional; that is, for the purpose of caus-
ing the plaintiff's emotional distress.
2) The conduct must be extreme and outrageous, characterizable by
the average member of the community as a complete denial of the
plaintiff's dignity as a person.
trict attorney shall, subpoena and examine other witnesses to ascertain
whether a crime has been committed and by whom committed. The extent
to which the magistrate may proceed in such examination is within his dis-
cretion. The examination may be adjourned and may be secret. If it appears
probable from the testimony given that a crime has been committed and
who committed it, the complaint shall be reduced to writing and signed and
verified; and thereupon a warrant shall issue for the arrest of the accused."
121 Wis. 2d 349, 124 N.W. 2d 312 (1963).
2 Id. at 358, 124 N.W. 2d at 317.
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